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The relevance of delayed disclosure to a complainant’s credibility in sexual assault
cases remains a problematic and confusing area in the law of evidence. Although section
275 of the Criminal Code abrogates the rules regarding recent complaint, courts have been
inconsistent in their interpretation and application of the provision since its enactment in
1983. The doctrine of recent complaint evolved from the assumption that a woman who is
sexually assaulted will disclose her violation at the first reasonable opportunity. In R. v.
D.D., the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that it is impermissible to draw an adverse
inference as to a complainant’s credibility based solely on delayed disclosure. Despite this
decision and section 275, many courts still rely on the assumption that real victims of sexual
violence will tell someone promptly.
In examining D.D.’s treatment in subsequent case law, the author finds that in many
sexual assault cases the starting presumption is still that victims who fail to complain
promptly are less credible. The author explains that the persistence of the “hue and cry”
myth results from engrained social assumptions about how sexual assault victims behave.
Triers of fact continue to resort to these problematic assumptions to fill gaps in reasoning
regarding circumstances where they have no firsthand knowledge or experience. The author
argues that it may not be enough to identify a particular social assumption as problematic.
In conclusion, the author makes two recommendations. First, trial judges should
circumscribe defence counsel cross-examination on delayed disclosure if the defence has
offered no evidence or explanation suggesting that the delay is relevant for some purpose
other than the hue and cry assumption. Second, the Supreme Court of Canada ought to revisit the conclusion in D.D. that expert evidence on the irrelevance of delayed disclosure,
standing alone, is not necessary.
Introduction
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When therefore a virgin has been so deflowered and overpowered, against the peace of the
lord the king, forthwith and while the act is fresh she ought to repair with hue and cry to the
neighboring vills and there display to honest men the injury done to her, the blood and her
dress stained with blood, and the tearing of her dress . . . 1

Introduction
“So let it be written, so let it be done” may have worked for Cecil B.
De Mille‟s Pharaoh in ancient Egypt, but there is less to suggest that it
works in the relationship between evidence law reform and judicial
assumptions, let alone broader social assumptions, regarding issues of
sexual violence. One evidence law issue that frequently arises in sexual
assault cases—the relevance of a delayed disclosure of sexual violation—
exemplifies this point.
The relevance of delayed disclosure in trials involving charges of
sexual offence continues to be an area of confusion and inconsistency in
the law of evidence. No doubt the vague and minimalistic language of
section 275—the 1983 addition to the Criminal Code which abrogates the
rules on recent complaint—has contributed to the lack of clarity in this
area of the law.2 However, its lack of guidance is likely not the sole cause
of the current inconsistencies in the case law on the relevance of the

1. R v DD, [2000] 2 SCR 275 at para 60, 148 CCC (3d) 41 [DD cited to SCR]. Justice
Binnie quotes Henrici de Bracton, a thirteenth-century scholar, cited in Wigmore on
Evidence, 2d ed (Boston: Little Brown, 1923) vol 3 at 764.
2. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 275. (“[t]he rules relating to evidence of recent
complaint are hereby abrogated . . . ”).
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timing, content and circumstances of a complainant‟s disclosure of sexual
violation. Part of the difficulty may stem from the fact that law reform on
this issue was ahead of social reform. The continued, albeit sometimes
unintentional, reliance by some courts on the assumption that victims of
sexual violation are likely to report the abusive acts promptly, suggests it
may not be sufficient simply to identify a particular social assumption as
problematic. To use the discourse commonly adopted in the context of
sexual assault law, it may not be enough to debunk a particular myth or
stereotype. Social assumptions have currency that is difficult to devalue.
They help people (including judges, jurors and lawyers) reason about
circumstances, relationships, problems and dynamics of which they have
no firsthand knowledge or experience. In this way, social assumptions may
sometimes be an unavoidable element of judicial reasoning on issues such
as the assessment of credibility. In the sexual assault trial context, where so
many of the social assumptions at work (oftentimes unexpressed and
perhaps even at an unconscious level) are ill-founded, they can be
decidedly tenacious.3
To give substantive effect to a law reform initiative such as “the
abrogation of the rules of recent complaint”, it may not be enough to
challenge, even explicitly, the validity of a particular assumption about
sexual violence. Admonishing a judge or jury not to reason based on an
engrained social assumption, without providing new information, may
create gaps in reasoning. Unsurprisingly, such gaps often get filled back in
with the same old problematic assumption. A review of sexual assault
cases involving assessments of the complainant‟s credibility suggests that,
in some cases adverse inferences as to complainant credibility continue to
be driven at least in part by the assumption that “real victims” of sexual
assault will tell someone promptly. Moreover, in many cases in which a
complainant is found to be credible, the starting position nonetheless
remains a (rebuttable) presumption that a delay in disclosure is a
discrediting factor.

3. For a well supported account of how this type of reasoning or decision-making pertains
to the sexual assault context, see Jennifer Temkin & Barbara Krahé, Sexual Assault and the
Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008).
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Part I of this paper provides an overview of the doctrine of recent
complaint. Part II discusses the abrogation of that doctrine, the continued
reliance on delayed disclosure in subsequent case law and the
interpretation of the Supreme Court of Canada‟s landmark ruling in R. v.
D.D. Problematic applications of the reasoning in D.D. are explored in Part
III. Part IV considers the challenges of overcoming engrained social
assumptions about victims of sexual assault. The paper concludes by
arguing that legal commentators, law reformers and judges must recognize
and respond to reasoning that continues to rely on these outdated
assumptions.

I. The Doctrine of Recent Complaint
Until 1983, in a prosecution for a sexual offence, evidence that the
complainant told someone of the violation at the first reasonable
opportunity was admissible on direct examination by the Crown in order to
bolster the victim‟s credibility as a witness. Typically, evidence of a
witness‟ out-of-court statement, introduced to bolster credibility by
establishing consistency between it and the witness‟ testimony in court, is
inadmissible according to the common law rule against self-serving
statements (also referred to as the rule against narrative). The Crown‟s
ability to lead evidence of a “recent complaint” was an exception to this
rule.4
Under this this exception, both the details of the complaint (including
the fact, time and circumstances of it) and the very words spoken were
admissible.5 This evidence could be relied upon to show consistency
between the complainant‟s out-of-court statement and her testimony in
4. The recent complaint exception was one of a number of exceptions to the rule excluding
evidence of prior consistent statements developed under the common law of evidence. The
others included: i) evidence of an eyewitness‟s prior identification of an accused; ii)
evidence to rehabilitate the credibility of a witness who is suggested to have had a motive to
fabricate the allegation; and iii) out-of-court statements forming part of the res gestae
(sometimes referred to as the narrative exception to the rule against narrative). See “Second
Report of the Federal/Provincial Task Force on Uniform Rules of Evidence” (Toronto:
Carswell, 1982) at 289 [“Second Report”].
5. Thomas v R, [1952] 2 SCR 344, 15 CR 1.
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court, in an effort to rebut the adverse inference a trier of fact would
otherwise draw regarding her credibility. To be admissible under this
exception, the out-of-court words had to be capable of constituting a
complaint, the complaint had to be recent (that is, made at first
opportunity) and it must have been made spontaneously rather than elicited
or prompted.6
There were two interrelated assumptions that underpinned the creation
and presumed logic of the rule permitting the Crown to lead evidence of a
“recent complaint”.7 The first was that women are not particularly credible
witnesses and tend to fabricate claims of rape.8 The second was that a
woman who is sexually violated will, at first opportunity, raise a hue and
cry.9 It was a “strong, but not a conclusive, presumption against a woman
that she made no complaint in a reasonable time after the fact”.10 While
arguably, the social and judicial assumption that women are not credible

6. Kribs v R, [1960] SCR 400, 33 CR 57 [Kribs]; Timm v R, [1981] 2 SCR 315, 28 CR (3d)
133. For the first several centuries of common law jurisprudence, the recent complaint
exception to the general rule prohibiting the Crown from leading evidence of prior consistent
statements to bolster a witness‟s credibility applied only to female complainants. It was only
in the mid-twentieth century that the exception was extended to all sexual assault trials and
all complainants. See Alan W Bryant, Sidney N Lederman & Michelle K Fuerst, The Law of
Evidence in Canada, 3d ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2009) citing R v Lebrun, [1951] OR 387,
100 CCC 16.
7. Kribs, supra note 6 at 62:
“The principle is one of necessity. It is founded on factual presumptions which . . . attach to
the subsequent conduct of the prosecutrix shortly after the occurrence of the alleged acts of
violence. One of these presumptions is that she is expected to complain upon first reasonable
opportunity, and the other, consequential thereto, is that if she fails to do so, her silence may
naturally be taken as a virtual self-contradiction of her story”.
8. The assumption that women lie about rape informed the early development of almost all
areas of evidence law related to sexual violence. See Christine Boyle, Sexual Assault,
(Toronto: Carswell Company, 1984) [Boyle].
9. DD, supra note 1.
10. Ibid at para 15 citing R v Lillyman, [1896] 2 QB 167 at 170. See D Fletcher Dawson,
“The Abrogation of Recent Complaint: Where Do We Stand Now?” (1984) 27 Crim LQ 59
[Dawson]. While a lack of recent complaint was not a legal bar to prosecution, it did reflect
adversely on the complainant. Given the assumption that women tend to lie about rape, and
the fact that credibility is the determining factor in most sexual assault trials, a lack of recent
complaint presumably did serve as a de facto bar to prosecution.
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witnesses has arguably been successfully challenged,11 the assumption that
real victims of sexual aggression will raise a hue and cry frequently
continues to reveal itself.
Both assumptions driving the recent complaint exception were
problematic, but for different reasons. The first assumption, characterizing
female complainants as unreliable and dishonest, was problematic for
several reasons, not the least of which was its blatant sex inequality. It was
only complainants of sexual offences, and not complainants of other
crimes, who were presumptively lying. Initially, this meant a formal
inequality, as it applied solely to rape victims, who by legal definition
could only be women. In the twentieth century, the doctrine of recent
complaint was extended to include all victims of sexual offences.
However, a substantive inequality persisted because the overwhelming
majority of complainants in sexual assault cases (at least in terms of adult
complainants) are female.
The second assumption—the hue and cry assumption—was
problematic not because of a formal inequality in the treatment of male and
female victims of crime, but because it was premised on an erroneous
belief about how victims of sexual assault behave. The hue and cry
assumption underpinning the recent complaint exception was premised on
the erroneous belief that the “natural” time for a woman to speak out about
her sexual violation is at the first opportunity.12
This belief was consistent with the general assumption that silence on
the part of witnesses, when it would be natural for them to speak, can give
rise to an adverse inference as to their credibility.13 Evidence led by the
defence suggesting that a complainant (of any crime) failed to complain
when it would have been natural for him or her to have done so, can be
taken to raise an allegation of recent fabrication—that is, an allegation that
11. There are certainly compelling arguments that challenge the suggestion that women, or
certain “types of women”, are no longer presumed dishonest witnesses in sexual assault
trials. See e.g. Lise Gotell, “The Ideal Victim, the Hysterical Complainant, and the
Disclosure of Confidential Records: The Implications of the Charter for Sexual Assault
Law” (2002) 40:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 251.
12. Kribs, supra note 6.
13. John Sopinka, Sidney N Lederman & Alan W Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada,
2d ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1999).
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a complainant concocted the story at some point subsequent to the date of
the alleged incident to which he or she was testifying.14 This gives the
Crown the opportunity to introduce evidence of a prior consistent
statement in order to rebut such an allegation.15
The assumption that the “natural” time for a woman to speak out about
her sexual violation will be at first opportunity is not simply questionable;
it may actually be illogical. The social stigma ascribed to sexual assault
victims, the general social discouragement to talk about anything to do
with sex, the shame experienced by those subjected to non-consensual
sexual interactions, and the likelihood of victim self-blame and fear of
one‟s abuser all serve as disincentives to reporting. These circumstances
are aggravated by the process of re-victimization that many complainants
experience at the hands of a justice system not equipped to accommodate
the incommensurate interests of complainants and accused. Why would
anyone assume that the “natural time” for a victim of sexual violation to
disclose is at first opportunity? Indeed, a more logical assumption is that
these and other disincentives make it more likely that people who are
sexually violated will avoid, or at the very least delay, telling anyone.
The Supreme Court of Canada has in recent years stated that it is no
longer permissible to rely on the assumption that the natural time for a
sexual assault victim to complain is promptly.16 In fact, the court has said
that the timing of disclosure is, alone, of no significance to a complainant‟s
credibility.17 Despite this, as will be discussed below, courts (including the
Supreme Court) have not consistently reflected the understanding that a
failure to complain promptly, taken alone, indicates nothing about a
complainant‟s credibility.

14. Ibid.
15. For sexual assault complainants, then, the issue of fabrication was presumed, regardless
of the defence‟s conduct in the case. This was unlike other crimes, where the issue arose
only if implied directly or indirectly by the defence.
16. R v WR, [1992] 2 SCR 122, 13 CR (4th) 257 [WR cited to SCR].
17. DD, supra note 1; WR, ibid. The Court has only been explicit about this in child
complainant cases. That said, they have never suggested that the same reasoning would not
apply to adult complainants.
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II. The Abrogation of the Doctrine of Recent
Complaint
In 1983, the Criminal Code was amended to add what is now section
275.18 This provision stipulates that “the rules relating to evidence of recent
complaint are hereby abrogated. . . .”19 The vague and unusual language of
section 275 left courts and commentators with several questions regarding
the precise intent of the provision.20 Does it mean that a trial judge is now
required to warn the jury not to draw an adverse inference from a lack of
recent complaint?21 Did the provision eliminate only the requirement that
the trial judge warn the jury about the risk of giving weight to testimony
not supported by evidence of a recent complaint, or did it also eliminate
the Crown‟s ability to lead evidence of recent complaint during its
examination-in-chief? If it did eliminate the Crown‟s ability to introduce
this evidence before a complainant‟s credibility has been attacked, then
under what circumstances can the Crown still introduce evidence of out-ofcourt complaints made by the victim? To what use can these statements be
put? Was the provision intended to limit or preclude the defence‟s ability
to raise a lack of recent complaint in order to discredit the complainant?

18. Criminal Law Amendment Act, SC 1980-81-82-83, c 125, s 19.
19. Supra note 2.
20. Prior to the adoption of section 246.5 (now section 275) of the Criminal Code,
abrogation was not a common term in Canadian law. Commentators expressed a great deal
of uncertainty as to what abrogation even meant. See Lorenne MG Clark, The Evidence of
Recent Complaint and Reform of Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Still Searching for
Epistemic Equality (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1993);
Boyle, supra note 8; Dawson, supra note 10. A proposed provision in a preceeding bill was
more complex and would have answered some of the questions left by the provision
ultimately adopted. See Boyle, supra note 8 at 151.
21. In R v TEM, 187 AR 273, 110 CCC (3d) 179 (CA) at para 9 [TEM cited to AR], the
Alberta Court of Appeal stated that a judge should warn a jury, in a case where there is little
or no evidence of prompt complaint and the Crown so requests, that as a matter of law, one
cannot say that a woman who is wronged will always complain at the first opportunity. In
DD, supra note 1, Justice Major concluded that expert evidence on delayed disclosure was
unnecessary, because an instruction to the jury not to draw an adverse inference would
suffice.
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Was the provision intended to preclude the trier of fact from drawing an
adverse inference when there is no evidence of a recent complaint?
Some post-amendment feminist commentary argued that the abrogation
of the doctrine of recent complaint made the presumptive adverse
inference against the complainant impermissible, but left in place the
exception to the rule against narrative (permitting the Crown to lead
evidence in chief of a recent complaint).22 However, courts have generally
assumed that the amendment not only removed the requirement that a
judge warn the jury about the danger of believing the complainant in those
cases where there was no evidence of recent complaint, but also eliminated
the recent complaint exception to the rule against prior consistent
statements.23 This has created uncertainty as to when the Crown may use
evidence of a complainant‟s prior consistent statements.24 The inconsistent
manner in which courts have approached this issue—in particular their use
of the oddly named narrative exception to the rule against narrative, as well
as the rules regarding rebuttal of recent fabrication—is a topic unto itself.25
It is the latter two related questions expressed in the preceding paragraph
that lie at the heart of this discussion. Can the defence raise delayed
disclosure to discredit the complainant? Can the trier of fact draw an
adverse inference from delayed disclosure? While the issues certainly
overlap, the focus of this paper is solely on this one aspect of what is
generally a complex and muddied area of evidence law: the assessment of
complainant credibility in those cases where the complainant delayed
disclosure.

22. See Clark, supra note 20.
23. Ibid.
24. See Lisa Dufraimont, “R c Dinardo: Troubling Issues Regarding Prior Consistent
Statements” (2008) 57 CR (6th) 76.
25. There is also a concern that the Crown‟s reliance on admissible evidence of recent
complaint to support the complainant‟s credibility will paradoxically reinforce the very
social assumption it is intended to rebut—that victims who complain promptly are more
credible. For a discussion, see Kathryn M Stanchi, “The Paradox of the Fresh Complaint
Rule” (1996) 37:3 BCL Rev 441.
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A. Judicial Approaches to the Relevance of Delayed Disclosure
As a matter of law, can the trier of fact draw an adverse inference based
on lack of recent complaint?
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. W.R. found that it was a
reversible error to draw an adverse inference as to the victim‟s credibility
where that adverse inference was based on the stereotypical view that
victims of sexual aggression are likely to report the violation in a timely
manner.26 In W.R., the accused was charged with sexual assault, gross
indecency and indecent assault against three young girls. Justice
McLachlin (as she then was) overturned the provincial Court of Appeal in
part because of its “reliance on the stereotypical but suspect view that the
victims of sexual aggression are likely to report the acts, a stereotype
which found expression in the now discounted doctrine of recent
complaint”.27
Despite this Supreme Court decision, in 1995 the Ontario Court of
Appeal, in R. v. O’Connor, affirmed a line of cases which determined that
“it is erroneous to state that a trier of fact is no longer entitled to draw an
adverse inference based on an absence of recent complaint”.28
Five years later in R. v. D.D., the Supreme Court of Canada, citing R. v.
W.R. as authority, again determined that it is a reversible error to rely upon
“outdated assumptions” about how rape victims act in order to discredit a
complainant.29 The issue in D.D. was whether to admit expert evidence
attesting to the fact that “in diagnosing cases of child sexual abuse, the
timing of disclosure, standing alone, signifies nothing. . . . [Disclosure]
depends upon the circumstances of the particular victim”.30 Justice Major,
for the majority, considered this evidence to be so obvious that he “found
surprising the suggestion that a Canadian jury or judge alone would be
incapable of understanding this simple fact”.31 He held:

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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DD, supra note 1 at para 63.
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[t]he significance of the complainant‟s failure to make a timely complaint must not be the
subject of any presumptive adverse inference based upon now rejected stereotypical
assumptions of how persons. . . react to acts of sexual abuse. . . . In assessing the credibility
of a complainant, the timing of the complaint is simply one circumstance to consider in the
factual mosaic of a particular case. A delay in disclosure, standing alone, will never give rise
to an adverse inference against the credibility of the complainant.32

Two years after D.D., the Ontario Court of Appeal, in R. v. Talbot,
upheld the admission of expert evidence stating that delayed disclosure,
inconsistent disclosure and recants signified nothing about the veracity of a
sexual assault complaint.33 It interpreted D.D. to have established that “the
reason that delayed disclosure means nothing in and of itself is that, as a
matter of law, no adverse inference can be drawn from a complainant‟s
delay in disclosing the allegations”.34 The Court in Talbot stated that it is
an error of law to draw an adverse inference as to credibility based on
stereotypical assumptions about how sexual assault victims behave, and
that
because this principle forms a recognized part of Canadian law, one can easily understand
why the Supreme Court found that the information offered by the expert in D.(D.) should
have gone to the jury in the form of an instruction from the trial judge. . . .The jury was not
permitted to draw an adverse inference from this delay as a matter of law and the trial judge
should have instructed them accordingly. 35

Recall, the majority in D.D. determined that it is impermissible to draw
an adverse inference based on delayed disclosure, that delayed disclosure
standing alone can never give rise to an adverse inference and that it is an

32. Ibid at paras 63, 65.
33. (2002), 1 CR (6th) 396, 161 CCC (3d) 256 (Ont CA) [Talbot].
34. Ibid at para 39. Talbot is an interesting case. The Ontario Court of Appeal, in response
to Justice Major‟s rejection of the need for expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases
involving delayed disclosure, may have distorted the analytical structure of the D.D. finding.
The court in Talbot concluded that the reason why expert evidence was not necessary in
D.D. was because of a legal principle, rather than the behaviour of child sexual abuse
victims as a matter of common sense. This allowed the court to admit expert evidence on the
related matter of recanted allegations, which, unlike delayed disclosure, was not the subject
matter of a legal principle. See infra note 38 for further discussion.
35. Talbot, supra note 33 at para 40.
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error of law to rely upon the stereotype that sexual assault victims will
raise a hue and cry. The majority also noted that timing is one
circumstance to consider in the factual mosaic of a particular case. Is it
possible to reconcile the reasoning in D.D. with cases such as O’Connor,
where the Ontario Court of Appeal determined that it is erroneous to
conclude that a trier of fact is not permitted to draw an adverse inference as
to credibility based on delayed disclosure? Can O’Connor be reconciled
with Talbot (in which the same court stated that, as a matter of law, no
adverse inference can be drawn from a complainant‟s delay in disclosing
the allegations)?
B. Interpreting R. v. D.D.: Permissible and Impermissible Reasoning
Certainly it is difficult to reconcile the reasoning in O’Connor with that
in Talbot, at least on the face of the decisions. However, depending upon
the interpretation of D.D. that is adopted, it may be possible to reconcile
O’Connor and Talbot with D.D. Regardless, given that D.D is the leading
precedent on the issue of delayed disclosure, it is necessary to understand
Justice Major‟s assertion that it is an error of law to draw an adverse
inference as to credibility based solely on the outdated stereotype that
victims of sexual assault will raise a hue and cry. The key to an
interpretation of D.D. that does not render it meaningless on the issue of
delayed disclosure, and the key to reconciling these seemingly inconsistent
lower court decisions, turns on what Justice Major meant by the term
“standing alone”.36
In R. v. D.D., the Court established that an adverse inference as to a
complainant‟s credibility in a sexual assault case cannot be drawn based
solely on delayed disclosure. This should mean that it is never permissible
to rely on the assumption that real victims of sexual violation are likely to
report in a timely fashion to create an inferential link between the delay
and the assessment of credibility. Justice Major‟s decision should be
understood to have established that delay will only be a relevant
discrediting factor where “the factual mosaic”37 of the particular case gives
36. DD, supra note 1 at para 63.
37. Ibid.

12

(2011) 36 Queen‟s L.J.

rise to an adverse inference which is not underpinned by the assumption
that the natural time to report a sexual violation is promptly. In the absence
of some other factor to suggest that the delay reveals something about the
complainant‟s credibility, it is not logically possible to draw an adverse
inference as to credibility that is not premised on the impermissible
assumption that victims of sexual violence are likely to report promptly. In
other words, a lack of recent complaint should not negatively affect the
credibility of the complainant where the inference is based on the social
assumption that it is “natural” not to delay disclosure. This means it will
only be acceptable to draw an adverse inference based on delay in
disclosure in those cases where there is some other reason why the delay
would reflect on the complainant‟s credibility.38
Think of it this way: inadequate evidence, or lack of evidence, to
answer the question “Why didn‟t you tell sooner?” should only give rise to
an adverse inference as to credibility where there is some reason, some
aspect of the factual mosaic, which would lead one to assume that this
complainant, in these circumstances, would have told someone sooner.
38. This interpretation would allow one to reconcile the reasoning in both O’Connor and
Talbot with D.D. by suggesting neither is wrong. Instead, neither are sufficiently specific or
nuanced in their language. O’Connor correctly stated that it is erroneous to conclude that an
adverse inference can never be based on delayed disclosure. According to D.D., an adverse
inference can be drawn where some other aspect of the factual mosaic makes the delay
relevant. Talbot stated that as a matter of law, an adverse inference cannot be drawn based
on delayed disclosure. This is also true. According to D.D., an adverse inference based on
delay cannot be drawn. Based on the timing of the disclosure there must be something more,
something other than delay alone to make an adverse inference as to credibility. That said,
there is another reading of Talbot that should be noted. At issue in Talbot was the admission
of expert evidence not just on delay, but also on other factors regarding disclosure. The
Court of Appeal relied on the assertion that it is an error of law to draw an adverse inference
based on delay and that this was why the expert evidence was considered unnecessary in
D.D. From this, it concluded that expert evidence regarding recants and inconsistent
disclosure was necessary because, unlike with delay, there was no legal bar against drawing
an adverse inference based on these behaviours. In D.D., the Supreme Court determined that
the expert opinion was not necessary because it was common sense not to read anything into
the timing of a disclosure alone, even though, as a matter of law, it was no longer
permissible to do this. The way the Court of Appeal framed the issue in Talbot allowed them
to admit the expert evidence regarding recants and incomplete disclosures without
contradicting the expert evidence element of the reasoning in D.D.
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Where the factual circumstances in the particular case suggest that this
particular complainant would have been likely to complain promptly, not
because it is the natural thing to do but because of the circumstances at
hand, it is proper to draw an adverse inference based on lack of timely
disclosure. Examples might include a circumstance where the complainant
had been sexually assaulted several times in the past and had always
reported promptly. In such a case, it is possible for an adverse inference to
be driven by her prior conduct, which may suggest she would have been
inclined to report as she had done in the past. Perhaps another example
would involve a circumstance where the complainant was given repeated
opportunities to disclose in a safe and supportive environment, and knew
that other individuals had accused the same person and the response was
supportive. A delay in disclosure can also properly discredit a complainant
of sexual assault where the delay is relied on to give rise to an adverse
inference because of factors such as memory loss.39 However, even with
the examples just described, courts must be cautious in ensuring that it is
the particular circumstances of the particular complainant that drives the
adverse inference, and not an underlying assumption or paradigm about
how women do, or should, respond to sexual violation.
The timing, in other words, must be tied to some other factual
circumstance. It must not rely upon an intermediate assumption that it is
natural for sexual assault victims to tell someone promptly. This must be
what Justice Major meant by the assertion that delayed disclosure
“standing alone” cannot give rise to an adverse inference against the
complainant‟s credibility. If this interpretation is not correct, then D.D.
establishes that a trier of fact can resort to stereotypical assumptions about
how sexual assault victims behave in order to discredit a complainant if
that trier of fact also has other reasons to disbelieve the complainant. This
cannot be what the Court in D.D. intended. If it is wrong to discredit a
complainant based on the stereotypical assumption that real victims of
sexual assault tell someone promptly, other factors, such as intoxication or

39. See e.g. R v A(A), 2009 NUCJ 1. Drawing an adverse inference as to credibility on the
basis that the lapse in time between the alleged incident and the disclosure has caused actual
memory loss does not resort to the hue and cry myth. Indeed, in such a case the inference is
actually driven by the loss of memory, not the timing itself.
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inconsistent testimony, do not make it acceptable to also consider her to be
discreditable based on the assumption that victims of sexual assault tell
someone promptly and this complainant did not.
Interpreting D.D. otherwise leads to formalistic reasoning such as that
of the Newfoundland Supreme Court and the Newfoundland Court of
Appeal in R. v. H.T. 40 In H.T., the trial judge acquitted the accused of
sexually assaulting his two nieces. Although the judge stated that he
thought the complainants were telling the truth, he determined that their
evidence still left him with a reasonable doubt. The very first factor he
identified as contributing to his doubt was their delay in disclosure:
Michelle B. and Deena B. each explained why they did not report the sexual assaults before
2006. Their reasons ranged from personal embarrassment through concern for how it would
affect their mother to the more altruistic motive of preventing it from happening to other
young girls. Deena B. also said that it was time that Mr. Harvey T. paid for what he did to
her. Their reasons may be relevant to them, but they are not substantial enough to justify
withholding such serious abuse for so long. Moreover, they do not answer the equally
obvious question of why they decided to disclose the assaults now, as opposed to five, ten,
fifteen or even twenty years ago.41

The need to justify a delayed disclosure in order to find a complainant
credible only arises when one is trying to overcome the impermissible
presumption that real victims report promptly. Essentially, the trial judge
in H.T. determined that the evidence offered to explain the delay (requiring
evidence to explain the delay is itself problematic) was not substantial
enough to rebut the presumption that real victims report in a timely
manner. Similarly, the question as to why a complainant did not report the
sexual violation sooner is obvious only to those who assume that the
natural behaviour of a sexual assault victim is to report the abuse
promptly.42
40. [2008] NLTD 106 (available on QL) [HT]; 2009 NLCA 69, 292 Nfld & PEIR 147.
41. HT, supra note 40 para 67.
42. The question as to why a complainant chooses to disclose at a particular time (as
opposed to five, ten or twenty years ago) may be an acceptable line of reasoning if it is not
underpinned by the impermissible assumption that it is natural not to delay disclosure.
Indeed, in such a circumstance the adverse inference may be driven by the opposite
assumption that, given the disincentives for disclosing, it would be natural for a sexual
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The trial judge went on to identify six other problems with the
complainants‟ evidence. Ultimately, he found that the cumulative effect of
what he described as “these unanswered questions regarding their
evidence” gave rise to a reasonable doubt.43 The other problems included
that the complainants went willingly to the accused‟s house despite years
of abuse, that they agreed to see him after the abuse had ended, and that
their parents testified that they were not aware of the alleged fourteen years
of abuse by the complainants‟ uncle. These first two factors rely on
reasoning based on another problematic (and ill-founded) social
assumption about how sexual assault victims behave--the assumption that
a real victim of sexual assault would avoid further contact with the
accused. Courts in some cases have recognized that it is problematic to
assume that continued association between a complainant and her alleged
abuser suggests that the sexual assault did not occur.44 Identifying the fact
assault complainant not to tell anyone. However, this was obviously not the trial judge‟s
reasoning in HT, supra note 40. Note that I am not suggesting that courts should adopt the
opposite assumption—that is, the assumption that the natural time to speak out is after great
delay or never. To do so would create another rebuttable presumption, in which
complainants could be discredited simply because they were unable to explain why they
disclosed now as opposed to ever. Such a presumption would unfairly impact the credibility
of complainants in cases where their motives for making the complaint were otherwise fairly
questioned. The safer assumption, and the one that expert witnesses in several cases have
tended to advocate in favour of, is that the timing of disclosure itself indicates nothing, one
way or the other, about the veracity of the allegation.
43. HT, supra note 40 at para 65.
44. See R v Nitsiza, 2007 NWTSC 53, 74 WCB (2d) 495, where the Court applied D.D. to
reject the defence argument that the complainant‟s allegations were suspect because had she
actually been sexually assaulted by the accused she would have acted in a hostile way
toward him afterwards and there was evidence that she maintained cordial contact. The
Appellant argued, at para 61, that “people who are sexually assaulted usually behave with
hostility to their assaulters—not in a friendly way!” The Court responded, at para 62, that
“[t]his submission assumes most or all people who have been sexually assaulted will react
the same way. That submission, with respect, is grounded neither in reality nor in law. The
Supreme Court of Canada expressed concern about this type of reasoning in the context of
assessing the significance of delay in reporting a sexual assault. What the Court said in that
context, in my view, is equally relevant to the assessment of other aspects of a person‟s
conduct following an alleged sexual assault”.
See also R v R (JW), 2007 BCCA 452, [2007] BCWLD 6820.
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that the parents testified that they were unaware of the abuse as a factor
giving rise to an adverse inference as to the complainants‟ credibility may
also be problematic. It is problematic if it is underpinned by the
assumption that parents always know when their children are being
abused, or even worse, by the assumption that parents would never ignore
the fact that their children are being sexually abused by another family
member.45
Regardless of the legitimacy of the trial judge‟s reasoning with respect
to these other potentially discrediting factors, the problem with his
reasoning regarding delayed disclosure remains. It is possible that the trial
judge in H.T. would have had reasonable doubt even without his findings
regarding the complainants‟ delayed disclosure. It is impossible to know
whether their failure to “justify” the delay pushed him over the threshold
into the realm of reasonable doubt. Whether it did or not, whether the
outcome in this particular case would have been different or not, the
reasoning was wrong.
On appeal, the Crown argued that the trial judge had erroneously drawn
an adverse inference as to credibility based on delayed disclosure. The
Newfoundland Court of Appeal rejected this argument on the basis that the
trial judge had considered the issue of delayed disclosure as part of a list
that included other problematic aspects of the complainants‟ evidence. The
Court of Appeal upheld this application of D.D., stating:
[W]e were also satisfied that he did not draw the adverse inference as to credibility from
delay in disclosure standing alone. Read as a whole his decision leads to the conclusion that
the delay was simply one of the circumstances he was entitled to consider. 46

Reliance on a particular line of reasoning or inference about a
complainant‟s credibility is not transformed into something else by adding
it to a laundry list of other factors (such as financial motive, malice or level
of intoxication) that may discredit a witness based on inferences of one‟s
own. Any other interpretation renders the substance of the Supreme
45. Indeed, in the H.T. case, one of the complainants testified that when she was quite
young she told her mother that “Uncle Harvey T. was honeyin‟ with me” but that her
complaint was just “passed off”. HT, supra note 40 at para 20.
46. HT, supra note 40 at para 7 [emphasis added].
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Court‟s decision in D.D. on the issue of delayed disclosure very difficult to
comprehend. If it is not permissible to rely on a particular stereotype or
assumption about how victims of sexual abuse behave, then reasoning
which resorts to that assumption is wrong. In H.T., the trial judge drew an
adverse inference as to credibility based on the presumption that sexual
assault victims will tell someone. That this adverse inference did not
“stand alone”, but rather was among a list of other adverse inferences, does
not change the nature of his reasoning on the issue of delayed disclosure. A
wolf hanging out in a herd of sheep is still a wolf.

III. Case Law Applying D.D.
Unfortunately, there is a continuing tendency on the part of some courts
in sexual assault cases, particularly those involving adult complainants,47 to
rely on the assumption that it is natural for victims of sexual violence to
tell someone. One of the more explicit examples of this is the trial court‟s
decision in R. v. Sandfly.48 The judge, in acquitting the accused, identified
the difficulties with the complainant‟s testimony as follows:
After the alleged sexual assault occurred, the complainant says that she made some effort to
wake up her sister. When she was not able to rouse her sister, she fell back to sleep and slept
for several more hours. This behaviour is typically inconsistent with somebody who has just
been violated . . . After she did wake up that morning, her subsequent actions were not
consistent with what she said had happened to her. She continued to drink alcohol. It was
only after she encountered her boyfriend and disclosed to him what she said happened to her,
that she decided to go to the hospital. That focus was to check to make sure she had not got
anything, presumably referring to a sexually transmitted disease, and not to complain about

47. See for example R v G(G), 99 OAC 44, 115 CCC (3d) 1 at para 43:
“The allegations cannot be assessed in the same way as those of an average adult victim
because the implications of a child‟s disclosure, given his or her complete social and
economic dependency, may be more cataclysmic than those of an adult, especially if the
target of the disclosure is a family member”.
48. (2008), 64 CR (6th) 53 [Sandfly].
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the alleged sexual assault. It was only after her version of events were provided to the
medical personnel that the police were called in.49

One should be wary of trial judgments that make statements about what
is and is not typical behaviour for a woman who has passed out after a
party and then has awakened to find herself being penetrated by a friend,
an acquaintance or a stranger with whom she had no intention of, or
interest in, having sex.50 In considering the issue of delayed disclosure, one
should be wary of judicial assessments of complainant credibility that use
the phrase “it was only after” in describing the timing of events that
concluded in a complaint of sexual offence.
The mistakes made in R. v. Sandfly are obvious; fortunately, they are
also unusual. Two less obvious and more frequent types of reasoning that
resort to the hue and cry myth (both of which occurred in H.T.) include the
following: (i) bootstrapping adverse inferences about delayed disclosure
onto unrelated adverse inferences regarding other discrediting factors;51
and (ii) presuming an adverse inference as to credibility unless the
complainant‟s evidence explains away the delay.52
49. Ibid at paras 17-18 [emphasis added]. There were other problems with the trial judge‟s
reasoning. He also relied, at paragraph 17, on the assumption that a real victim of rape would
fight back to discredit the victim: “[o]ne might have expected her, in those circumstances, to
be more vocal and animated in her protestation”.
50. For a discussion regarding the frequency with which this factual circumstance comes
before the courts, see Janine Benedet, “The Sexual Assault of Intoxicated Women”, (2010)
CJWL, (forthcoming); see also Elaine Craig, “Ten Years After Ewanchuk The Art of
Seduction is Alive and Well: An Examination of the Mistaken Belief in Consent Defence”
(2009) 13:3 Can Crim L Rev 247.
51. See e.g. R v Handy, 2002 SCC 56 at para 23, [2002] 2 SCR 908 [Handy]; R v Williams,
(2004), 183 CCC (3d) 510, 2004 BCCA 207 [Williams]; HT, supra note 40.
52 For cases where the court found that the complainant did not “explain away the delay”,
see HT, supra note 40; R v JM, 2004 CarswellOnt 6693 (WL Can) [JM]; R v M(B), 2007
NSPC 56 (available on WL Can); R v L(HA), 2002 CarswellMan 370 (WL Can) at para 46
(Man Prov Ct)[L(HA)]; R v Palardy, 2007 CarswellOnt 9687 (WL Can) at para 108 (Ont Ct
J) [Palardy]; R v CR, 2008 CarswellOnt 812 (WL Can) at para 86 (Ont Sup Ct) [CR]. For an
example of this reasoning in a civil proceeding, see S(D) v Mascoll, 2001 CarswellOnt 2123
(WL Can) (Ont Sup Ct). For cases where the court found that the delay had been sufficiently
justified, see R v Pikayuk, 2009 NUCJ 14 [Pikayuk]; R v BJW, 2006 ONCJ 455, 72 WCB
(2d) 29 [BJW]; R v CDR, 53 WCB (2d) 127 (NL Prov Ct) [CDR]; R v B(FF), [1993] 1 SCR
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A. Bootstrapping Delay onto Other Discrediting Factors
In R. v. Handy, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the credibility
of a similar fact witness alleging sexual assault by her then husband. It
found that “[t]he credibility of the ex-wife was problematic. She had
considerably delayed reporting any of the incidents. The eventual timing of
her complaints raised issues with respect to her motives”.53 She first
reported the allegations of her abuse to a victim‟s compensation fund while
her ex-husband was in prison. There was evidence that the ex-wife had told
the complainant in Handy that if she alleged rape she too could get money
from this fund. Such evidence is probative of the ex-wife‟s motives and
thus of her credibility.54 There is a permissible inference capable of making
her statement to the complainant about compensation probative of her
motives regarding her own allegations: if she suggested to the complainant
that the complainant fabricate allegations in order to receive money,
perhaps she had the same idea for herself. But that is not the reasoning
Justice Binnie relied upon in the above statement about her delay in
reporting the incidents. He said that she had considerably delayed reporting
697, 18 CR (4th) 261 [B(FF)]; R v OA, 63 WCB (2d) 303 (Ont Sup Ct) [OA]; R v PC, 2004
ONCJ 160, 72 WCB (2d) 288 [PC]; R v Hoosein, 2010 ONSC 4452 (available on QL)
[Hoosein]; R v H(H), 2009 ONCJ 730 (available on QL) [H(H)]; R v L(F), 2002
CarswellOnt 178 (WL Can) (Ont Sup Ct) [L(F)]; R v Skunk, 2010 ONCJ 209 (available on
WL Can) [Skunk]; R v C(DA), 2010 SKQB 194 (available on WL Can) [C(DA)]; R v Oickle,
2010 NSSC 182 (available on WL Can) [Oickle]; R v Hoang, 2005 CarswellOnt 5929 (WL
Can) (Ont Sup Ct) [Hoang]; R v Nayanookeesic, 2010 ONCJ 47 (available on WL Can)
[Nayanookeesic]; R v K(M), 2006 CarswellOnt 7933 (WL Can) (Ont Sup Ct) [K(M)]; R v
S(TH), 2002 CarswellOnt 5313 (WL Can) (Ont Ct J) [S(TH)]; R v C(P), 2004 ONCJ 160
(available on WL Can) [C(P)]. See also R v B(R), 2006 CarswellOnt 5151 (WL Can) (Ont
Sup Ct) [B(R)].
53. Handy, supra note 51. Handy was not actually a case about recent complaint; Justice
Binnie‟s comment regarding delayed disclosure was made in the context of an analysis about
similar fact evidence. Nevertheless, it reveals the continued vitality of the hue and cry
assumption. He did discredit the similar fact witness, in part, based on her delayed
disclosure. This was unnecessary to his decision and is, in principle, inconsistent with the
reasoning in DD.
54. The potential for collusion that such evidence suggests also destroys the probative value
(and thus the admissibility) of her similar fact evidence in support of the allegations of the
complainant in Handy, ibid.
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and that “the eventual timing of her complaints raised issues with respect
to her motives”.55 How does a delay in disclosure give rise to an inference
that she had financial motives to fabricate the allegations? How does the
fact that she had not complained until she was before the victim‟s
compensation board give rise to an inference that she had a financial
motive to lie? But for the assumption that victims of sexual assault are
likely to report their violation promptly, what other logical connection
between these two considerations makes the delay in reporting relevant to
the possible financial motives? The answer is that there is no other logical
connection. Embedded within Justice Binnie‟s reasoning is the very
inference that the Court in W.R. and D.D. ruled was impermissible: the
assumption that real victims of sexual violence are likely to report
promptly.
Evidence that the ex-wife suggested to someone else that they fabricate
a complaint in order to receive compensation would discredit her as a
witness, without any need to resort to the impermissible hue and cry
assumption. The following is permissible reasoning: “I find that you
suggested to X that she make up a story about rape in order to receive
money. This leads me to conclude that you are not a credible witness based
on the inference that you may have had the same idea for yourself”.
Similarly, evidence that an individual sought compensation from a
victim‟s compensation board at all may discredit her without resorting to
the hue and cry assumption: “The possibility that you fabricated this
allegation in order to receive money makes it less believable to me”. This,
too, is permissible reasoning. In most cases, given the disincentives for
reporting sexual violence, this reasoning will likely not be very probative.
Conversely, the following is not permissible reasoning: “The fact that
you did not tell anyone until you went to the victim‟s compensation board
suggests to me that the only reason you are alleging sexual assault is to
obtain money”. It is impermissible because it relies on the assumption that
had this woman actually been raped by her ex-husband, she would have
told someone sooner. It relies on that assumption without tying it to some
other factual circumstance. In Handy, not only was no other factual
circumstance offered to connect the adverse inference with her failure to
55. Handy, supra note 51.
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complain in a timely manner, but Justice Binnie explicitly used the delay
to infer suspect financial motives.
Again, relying on evidence of a possible financial motive to lie in order
to question credibility is proper. But bootstrapping evidence of delayed
disclosure onto inferential reasoning regarding other issues of credibility,
with which it has no logical connection, does not avoid relying on the
assumption that real victims of sexual aggression are likely to report
promptly. The Supreme Court of Canada‟s reasoning in Handy, released
only two years after D.D., reflects the persistence (and perhaps the
insidiousness) of this assumption about how sexual assault victims behave.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal‟s decision in R. v. Williams
offers another example of this same type of problematic reasoning.56 In
Williams, the Court of Appeal overturned a sexual assault conviction on
the basis that the trial judge had misdirected himself on the evidence. As
recognized by both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal, the Crown‟s
case depended upon the testimony of the complainant. The Court of
Appeal found that the evidence was too weak to sustain a conviction, in
part because “the circumstances under which the complaint was made are
extremely suspicious. The complainant admitted that she reported the
incident only after eight years of physical and verbal abuse from her
husband”.57 The Court held that “in light of those circumstances, the
defence argument that the complainant had „a motive to lie‟ ought to have
been more fully addressed”.58 There were difficulties with the
complainant‟s testimony in Williams that could properly be relied upon to
draw an adverse inference as to her credibility. These included
inconsistencies in her testimony regarding what year the rape occurred and
concerns about her possible motives for making the allegation. The
problem is that the delay in reporting should not have been among the
factors considered by the Court. As in Handy, the timing of disclosure
itself does not logically give rise to suspicion about motives without an
intermediate reliance on the impermissible assumption that real victims do
not delay disclosure.
56. Williams, supra note 51.
57. Ibid at para 22.
58. Ibid.
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B. Assuming a Rebuttable Presumption
The fact that the hue and cry assumption continues to inform judicial
reasoning is evidenced by the many cases in which courts feel compelled
to provide reasons as to why a complainant is credible despite the delayed
disclosure.59 For example, in R. v. Pikayuk, the judge noted that “despite
the inconsistencies in her evidence and failure to cry out I believe the
complainant was a truthful witness”.60 Consider also Judge Nightingale‟s
comment in R. v. P. (J.L.C.) that he was “aware that . . . delay in disclosure
ought not inevitably lead to a conclusion that the disclosure is untrue”.61
D.D. rejected the rebuttable presumption regarding delayed disclosure. Not
only is an adverse inference as to credibility based on delayed disclosure
not inevitable, it is not permissible, without some other factual
circumstance.
Unlike the problematic reasoning in cases like Handy and Sandfly, in
which the hue and cry assumption continues to discredit the complainant,
the reasoning in cases where the court finds a complainant credible despite
the delay do not constitute an error of law. This is because they do not
draw an adverse inference of credibility based on delayed disclosure alone.
In these cases, the courts find reasons to overcome the presumption. This is
obviously not the same as rejecting it. If a delay in disclosure standing
alone signifies nothing, it should not be necessary to justify the delay in
order to find that it does not discredit the complainant. In these cases the
starting position is still an assumption that a failure to complain promptly
discredits a sexual assault complainant. While the outcome of the
credibility assessment is not problematic in these cases, such reasoning
continues to reinforce the hue and cry assumption. Starting from the
assumption that delay is a discrediting factor (and then articulating reasons

59. See e.g. the following cases at supra note 52: Pikayuk; BJW; CDR; B (FF); OA; PC;
Hoosein; H(H); L(F); Skunk; C(DA); Oickle; Hoang; Nayanookeesic; K(M); S(TH); C(P).
See also B(R), supra note 52, in which the trial judge rejects certain allegations based on an
adverse inference as to the complainant‟s credibility because of a failure to report when
given the opportunity, but found the complainant credible with respect to other allegations.
60. Pikayuk, supra note 52.
61. 2007 SKPC 131 at para 21, 53 CR (6th) 199.
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for finding the complainant credible regardless) not only fails to challenge
the presumption, but actually gives credence to it.
Even more problematically, in some recent cases trial judges have
drawn an adverse inference as to credibility where the complainant‟s
testimony has failed to rebut the presumption that a truthful victim of
sexual assault will complain promptly.62 Reminiscent of H.T., in which the
trial judge found that the complainants‟ evidence did not sufficiently
justify their delayed disclosures, the Ontario Superior Court in R. v. J.M.
acquitted the accused because “the complainant had no reasonable
justification for not telling the police about the sexual assault until after she
was taken to the police station”.63 In J.M., the Court determined that the
case turned on the complainant‟s credibility. Justice Brown found that
there was reasonable doubt as to whether the accused, her ex-boyfriend,
had sexually assaulted her. Despite significant reference to D.D., Justice
Brown was not satisfied with her explanation as to why it took four days to
report the incident to the police.64 Her explanation was that she had had
previous dealings with the police that were “[not] the best” and so she had
decided to try to deal with it herself.65 The trial judge also found the lack of
evidence to explain why she waited until she was at the police station to
disclose the sexual assault to be a discrediting factor: “[w]hen asked why
she didn‟t mention the sexual assault at her apartment earlier, before going
to the police station, the complainant replied she did not know”.66 This is
only a discrediting factor if one assumes that the natural time to raise a
complaint is at first opportunity.
Justice Russell, of the New Brunswick Court of Queen‟s Bench, made
the same type of mistake in R. v. Sark.67 Justice Russell found that the

62. See e.g. R v B(M), 2007 NLTD (available on WL Can) at para 44; R v JM, [2004] OJ
No 5976 (QL) (Ont Sup Ct); HT, supra note 40; L(HA), supra note 52; Palardy, supra note
at 52 para 108; CR, supra note 52.
63. JM, supra note 52. The court was clear in J.M. that the failure to justify the delay in
disclosure was, on its own, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.
64. Ibid at para 39.
65. Ibid at para 37.
66. Ibid.
67. 2004 NBQB 425 (available on WL).
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complainant‟s explanation as to why she did not report the rape to health
care providers was insufficient:
The complainant's position that she did not report the rape during the admission to the Dr.
Everett Chalmers Hospital in 1979 or to other mental health advisors is important. She says
she was depressed in 1979 because of the rape and the death of her father. The rape,
however, was not mentioned because, according to the complainant, of communication
problems with her treating psychiatrist. Her father's death was, however, reported. As far as
the later advisors were concerned she said, „I didn‟t want to say it‟. Neither reason is
credible. If one accepts she had already reported the matter to the RCMP in 1978 then shame
or guilt should not have been a significant factor.68

It is clear from Justice Russell‟s reasoning that he started from the
assumption that a complainant‟s failure to speak out about her violation
must be explained if her allegations are to be believed. These cases
demonstrate how this persistent social assumption continues to inform
credibility assessments. Given the imperviousnessof the hue and cry myth,
what legal strategies might encourage triers of fact not to resort to it?

IV. Law Re-forming Reality:
Engrained Social Assumptions

Challenging

Feminists who lobbied for an amendment to the criminal law
eliminating the special treatment of prior consistent statements under the
recent complaint doctrine hoped that it would “rid the law of any idea that
„real‟ rapes would be complained about at the earliest „reasonable‟
opportunity and that failing to do so casts doubt on the truthfulness of the
complainant”.69 Situated within a broader law reform project aimed at
dismantling several stereotypical assumptions about rape, the feminist
impetus for law reform on this issue was to change the underpinning social
assumption that victims of sexual violence will complain at first
opportunity, by changing the legal presumptions regarding evidence (or
lack of evidence) of recent complaint. Feminist involvement at the time
was hardly premised on the belief that legal presumptions simply had to be
68. Ibid at para 30.
69. Clark, supra note 20 at 22.
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aligned with reformed social attitudes about sexual violence.70 Amidst
significant apprehension on the part of feminist activists who expressed
concern regarding the use of law as a tool for social change, feminist
intervention on the issue of sexual assault law at the time was aimed at
using law reform to challenge legal and social misperceptions about
rape—assumptions that these scholars and activists identified as alive and
well in both judicial and social contexts.71
The impetus of legislative reformers, on the other hand, may have been
different. From their perspective, the reform seems to have been motivated
by a recognition that the social assumption had changed and that it was
thus necessary to amend the law so that it no longer reflected “outdated
assumptions” about how rape victims act. For example, the 1981 report by
the Federal/Provincial Task Force on Uniform Rules of Evidence
suggested that the doctrine of recent complaint was anomalous and
arbitrary and should be reformed on the basis that “the expectations of
medieval England as to the innocent victim of a sexual attack are no longer
relevant” and that “[i]n contemporary society, there is no longer a logical
connection between the genuineness of a complaint and the promptness
with which it is made”.72 Were that it were so. Labeling a social
assumption or stereotype “outdated” does not make it so, regardless of
whether it is courts or legislators doing the labeling. A social assumption is
only outdated when it is no longer relied upon.

70. Ibid at 1.
71. For a feminist critique of the power of law to effect social change, see Carol Smart,
Feminism And The Power of Law (New York: Routledge, 1989). In the Canadian context,
see Sheila McIntyre, “The Charter: Driving Women to Abstraction” Broadside 6:5 (1985) 8;
Brettel Dawson, “Legal Structures: A Feminist Critique of Sexual Assault Reform” (1985)
14:3 Resources for Feminist Research 40; Sheila McIntyre, “Redefining Reformism: The
Consultations that Shaped Bill C-49” in Julian Roberts & Renate Mohr, eds, Confronting
Sexual Assault: A Decade of Legal and Social Change (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1994) at 293. This is likely why some feminist commentators at the time argued that
while the 1983 amendment to the Criminal Code should remove the trial judge‟s ability to
instruct the jury about the complainant‟s lack of credibility, the amendment should not be
understood to have removed the exception permitting the Crown to lead evidence in chief of
a recent complaint where such evidence existed. See Dawson, supra note 10.
72. “Second Report”, supra note 4.
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To be sure, there are many examples where courts have properly
applied D.D. In these cases, courts have not inferred anything from a
delayed disclosure absent additional circumstances making it relevant, nor
have they premised their findings of credibility on the complainant‟s
ability to explain away the delay.73 In R. v. S.(W.) for example, the Court
stated that the complainant‟s “delay in disclosing the sexual assaults to her
parents must be viewed in the context of the principles set out in R. v.
D.(D.)”.74 Justice Mossip then resolved the issue of the timing of the
complaint by stating: “in the particular circumstances of this case, I am
unprepared to draw an adverse inference against A. because she delayed in
reporting the sexual abuse to her parents”.75 Justice Mossip offered no
justification for refusing to draw an adverse inference based on delay.
Presumably his decision was based on the fact that in the particular
circumstances of that case there was no intermediate factor that would give
rise to an adverse inference for reasons other than the assumption that “real
victims” report promptly.
Similarly, in R. v. B. (J.A.), the Court found that the complainant was
not credible for a number of reasons, but delay was not among them. The
only reference it made to the timing of the disclosure was the statement
that “the fact that a child delays disclosure of a sexual assault should also
not reflect adversely on the child‟s credibility. Without more, delayed
disclosure is meaningless”.76
Despite the fact that many courts do get it right, many do not. As
discussed in the previous section, in many cases courts still do start from
the presumption that a failure to disclose reflects adversely on the
complainant‟s credibility. While in many of these cases, courts find that
sufficient justification for the delay has been provided, in some they do
not. If judges are continuing to do this, juries may be as well.
If it is correct, then, that despite law reform, the hue and cry
assumption continues to inform judicial assessments of complainant
73. See e.g. R v A(A), 2004 CarswellOnt 647 (WL Can)(Ct J) [A(A)]; R v S(C), 2007 ONCJ
502 (available on QL); R v Sacrey, 2009 CarswellNB 332 (WL Can); R v R(CD) 2002
CarswellNfld 49 (WL Can).
74. 2002 CarswellOnt 530 (WL Can) at para 87.
75. Ibid.
76. R v JAB, 55 WCB (2d) 456 at para 49, [2002] OTC 723.
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credibility in many sexual assault cases, be it at an unarticulated or even
unconscious level, the question becomes this: how can baseless or even
illogical assumptions be prevented from discrediting complainants? This
question is particularly salient, and particularly difficult, in the context of
sexual assault law. Social assumptions will always inform inferential
reasoning as to credibility, especially on issues on which an assessor lacks
firsthand knowledge or experience.77 In a context where credibility is so
central to the outcome, and where so many of the assumptions that
underpin social and judicial understandings of sexual violence are not well
founded, it becomes particularly important to identify legal reasoning
where these assumptions continue to operate despite law reforms. Among
these assumptions are the following: women who are actually raped will
scream out; women who fail to defend themselves are more likely to have
consented; promiscuous women are more likely to consent; and sexual
assault victims will always be hostile toward their abusers. It is critical to
unpack the specific inferences that drive adverse findings with respect to
complainant credibility in sexual assault cases. It is also important to
recognize that labeling an assumption, stereotype or myth as outdated does
not make it so. With this in mind, it is necessary to consider other avenues
through which to challenge engrained, but baseless, social assumptions
about sexual violence.
The final part of this paper makes two suggestions for responding to
this issue. The first is that it is the responsibility of trial judges to
circumscribe defence counsel‟s cross-examination on delayed disclosure in
cases where the defence has not offered any evidence or explanation
suggesting that the delay is relevant to some inference not reliant on the
hue and cry assumption. The second is that the Supreme Court of Canada
ought to re-visit the conclusion in D.D. that expert evidence regarding the
irrelevance of delayed disclosure, standing alone, is unnecessary.
A. The Limits on Cross-Examination
Some commentators and courts have suggested that section 275
establishes that the defence cannot cross-examine a complainant about a
77. Temkin & Krahé, supra note 3 at 33.
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lack of recent complaint.78 However, courts have for the most part
concluded that defence counsel is still permitted to raise the issue of
delayed disclosure (either implicitly or explicitly) in order to discredit the
complainant.79
On one hand, this is consistent with the rules in non-sexual offence
cases, where the defence is allowed to suggest that a complainant‟s silence,
when it would be natural to speak, discredits the complainant‟s testimony.
Where the defence does raise “failure to speak when it would be natural to
have done so”, it is considered to have made an allegation of recent
fabrication. This entitles the Crown to introduce evidence of a complaint
made either at the time it would purportedly have been “natural to speak”,
or prior to that time, in order to respond to the allegation of recent
fabrication.80
On the other hand, allowing the defence to seek an adverse inference
based solely on delayed disclosure is problematic. If it is an error of law to
draw an adverse inference based on this outdated stereotype, then evidence
of a lack of recent complaint (adduced through cross-examination of the
complainant) should be irrelevant in those cases where the defence seeks to
introduce it to discredit the complainant solely on the basis that she or he
did not raise a hue and cry in a timely fashion.81
78. R v Temple, (1984) 12 WCB 71 (Ont Co Ct), where the court held that the defence was
precluded from any cross-examination on this issue. See R v Ward, (2008) 234 CCC (3d)
159 (CA), 856 APR 183 [Ward] aff‟g 2007 CarswellNfld 418 (WL Can) on this point. For a
general discussion on this point see Clark, supra note 20. For a case which amply
demonstrates why defence counsel should not be permitted to cross-examine on what an
irrelevant fact is, without some intervening consideration, see A(A), supra note 73. The trial
judge in this case strongly rejected defence counsel‟s urging that the complainant be
discredited because she failed to raise a hue and cry at first opportunity.
79. See e.g. R v F (JE) (1994), 16 OR (3d) 1, 85 CCC (3d) 457 (CA); TEM, supra note 21;
O’Connor, supra note 28.
80. O’Connor, ibid.
81. See e.g. Ward, supra note 78 at para 22F:
“Case law such as R v D.D . . . and section 275 of the Criminal Code no longer permit the
defence to seek a negative inference about a complainant‟s testimony in a sexual assault case
solely on the basis of a lack of timeliness of a complaint . . . However, the defence is
entitled, as it did in this case, to explore in cross-examination the delay in reporting the
sexual assault provided that the inquiry is not based solely on stereotypic or erroneous
assumptions”.
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Protecting an accused‟s opportunity to cross-examine Crown witnesses
is, of course, of fundamental importance to the legitimacy of our criminal
justice system. Nevertheless, rights are never absolute. The defence is not
entitled to cross-examine a complainant to elicit evidence regarding
credibility if the probative value of that evidence is substantially
outweighed by the unfair prejudice that might flow from it.82 In R. v.
Osolin, Justice Cory stated that “[c]ross-examination for the purposes of
showing consent or impugning credibility which relies upon „rape myths‟
will always be more prejudicial than probative”.83 In fact, crossexamination on the timing of a complaint, standing alone, elicits evidence
with no probative value. It elicits evidence in order to raise an inference
that triers of fact are not entitled to draw. Defence counsel should be
required to demonstrate that the evidence could potentially fulfill a
legitimate purpose.84 Where defence counsel fails to do so, the trial judge
should not allow this line of questioning to proceed.
If defence counsel were not permitted to cross-examine complainants
on the timing of disclosure, that is, without offering some explanation
making it relevant for a reason other than the hue and cry assumption,
complainants would not be put in the position of having to justify their
timing. Trial judges would not then find it necessary to point to evidence to
justify their refusal to draw an adverse inference based on delay alone.
This is a self-perpetuating issue that could cycle in either direction. As it
currently stands, the unclear wording in D.D. often compels trial judges to
highlight evidence justifying delayed disclosure in cases where they find
the complainant credible.
At this point, the reasoning in cases such as R. v. M. (T.J.) may be the
most advisable approach for trial judges who do not want to be erroneously
overturned for failing to justify a finding of credibility despite the delayed
disclosure. In R. v. M. (T.J.) the trial judge highlighted the reasons why he
“accept[ed] S.M.‟s explanation of why she did not disclose the abuse any
earlier” but then rejected the defence submission that S.M.‟s late disclosure
should impugn her credibility, because it “reflects a reliance on a
82. R v Seaboyer, [1991] 2 SCR 577 at 580.
83. [1993] 4 SCR 595 at para 37, 109 DLR (4th) 478.
84. See R v Shearing, 2002 SCC 58 at para 119, 3 SCR 33.
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stereotypical, but suspect view, that the victims of sexual aggression are
likely to report the acts immediately”.85
B. It is easier to teach a dog to fish than to teach a dog not to fish
Another possible response to the continued role that the hue and cry
assumption plays in assessments of complainant credibility pertains to the
use of expert evidence. In D.D., Justice Major concluded that expert
evidence on the (in)significance of delayed disclosure was inadmissible.
According to Justice Major, the evidence did not meet the necessity criteria
under the Mohan test for the admissibility of expert opinion. Under
Mohan, expert evidence will only be admitted if it provides information
likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury.86 In
D.D., Justice Major deemed the evidence unnecessary because it was, in
his estimation, a matter of common sense not to discredit a complainant
based on the outdated assumption that victims of sexual assault are likely
to complain without delay; the matter could be addressed by a warning to
the jury or the taking of judicial notice. Given the continued reliance on
this social assumption, both by the Supreme Court of Canada and by lower
courts, it seems that Justice McLachlin‟s dissent was correct to conclude
that the issue of delayed disclosure does involve matters beyond the
ordinary knowledge and expertise of the judge or jury.
For two decades prior to D.D., courts admitted expert evidence on
delayed disclosure to assist triers of fact in child sexual abuse cases.87
Experts in these cases included social workers and psychologists, with
years of experience observing children who had been sexually abused and
children who falsely alleged that they had been sexually abused.88 Expert
opinion was admitted to explain that it is not uncommon for children to fail
to take an opportunity to disclose when given one, or to fail to support a

85. 2009 BCSC 1212, [2009] BCWLD 7332, at paras 139-140.
86. R v Mohan, [1994] 2 SCR 9, 29 CR (4th) 243.
87. See e.g. R v C(G) (1996), 144 Nfld & PEIR 204, 110 CCC (3d) 233 (CA) [C(G)]; R v
M(RM) (1998), 106 OAC 191, 122 CCC (3d) 563 (CA) [RM]; R v T(DB) (1994), 71 OAC
233, 89 CCC (3d) 466 (CA); R v C(RA) (1990), 78 CR (3d) 390, 57 CCC (3d) 522 (BCCA).
88. C(G), supra note 87.
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sibling when he or she has disclosed similar abuse.89 Experts testified that
there is no normal response to sexual abuse, that timing of disclosure will
vary and that there are many reasons why victims fail to report promptly.90
The nuance and complexity of sexual (mis)behaviour and responses to
sexual (mis)behaviour are not readily accommodated by law and legal
process. Inevitably, some triers of fact will rely on social assumptions to
fill gaps in reasoning, particularly when it comes to sexual circumstances
of which they have no firsthand knowledge or experience. The
development of the doctrine of recent complaint, its “abrogation” in 1983
and the continued reliance by courts, almost thirty years later, on the
assumption thought to be outdated in 1983, is a fascinating example of the
complex interaction between law and social reform. The tenacity with
which this engrained social assumption about sexual violence continues to
prevail suggests that labelling it outdated and admonishing triers of fact
not to rely on it is insufficient. It may be necessary to provide triers of fact
with more than a warning that it is an error of law to rely on an assumption
that they may not even realize is informing their inferential reasoning. That
it should be common sense not to make baseless assumptions about how
sexual assault victims behave does not mean that it currently is common
sense not to do this. The social assumption that victims of sexual assault
report promptly forms part of a common and longstanding narrative about
how sexual assault victims (and actually, women more broadly) behave. It
may be that substantive change in the criminal law‟s response to sexual
violence requires new narratives, not just new laws.
Law is inextricably anchored in narrative. Narrative gives meaning to
law. To use Robert Cover‟s language, a nomos, or normative universe, is
made up of prescriptions (that is, laws, rules and norms) and the narratives
that give them meaning.91 In addition, narrative is integral to social
movements. New accounts of experience and observation are essential to
the processes of disruption, iconoclasm and re-articulation that ensure the

89. RM, supra note 87.
90. DD, supra note 1.
91. Robert Cover, “Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97:1 Harv L Rev 4.
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law stays open to new possibilities. Stories, as Kenneth Plummer suggests,
are social acts.92
Many of the reforms in Canadian sexual assault law have been
influenced by feminist theory. They have been oriented toward dispelling
what feminists and jurists have come to describe as sexual myths and
stereotypes about rape. Unsurprisingly, as a result, the reforms both by
courts and Parliament in the last twenty-five years have been deeply and
explicitly informed by feminist thought. But despite these reforms, many
of the assumptions regarding “how a rape victim behaves” or “how women
respond to sexual violence” continue to inform the reasoning in sexual
assault cases.93 Perhaps, in part, this is a function of a failure to adequately
replace these so-called myths and stereotypes with new or different
accounts about sexuality in the context of sexual assault cases. It is not
enough simply to dispel one narrative or story about sex, sexual
interactions and sexual violence. To create effective change at the level of
inferential reasoning requires more than simply identifying stereotypical
thinking about sexual assault and proscribing reasoning based upon it.
Substantive change requires: i) law reform; ii) the identification of a
problematic social assumption and the narrative that underpins it; and iii) a
new narrative.
Expert witnesses with experience in observing and dealing with sexual
assault complainants can provide a contextual backdrop against which new
narratives might be formed. They can do more than a jury warning could
ever achieve. Think, for example, of the role that expert opinion played in
R. v. Lavallee,94 where expert testimony facilitated the legal recognition of
battered wife syndrome. This is an advance that would not likely have been
achieved through judicial notice alone.95 That said, the admission of expert

92. Ken Plummer, Telling Sexual Stories: Power, Change and Social Worlds, (London:
Routledge, 1995) at 16.
93. Temkin and Krahé demonstrate this “justice gap” as they label it in Sexual Assault and
the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude, supra note 3.
94. [1990] 1 SCR 852 [Lavallee].
95. In Lavallee, ibid, an expert witness testified at length regarding the accused‟s “ongoing
terror, her inability to escape the relationship despite the violence and the continuing pattern
of abuse which put her life in danger. He testified that in his opinion the appellant‟s shooting
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evidence is a complicated issue involving consideration of many factors,
such as preserving the role of the jury and avoiding the admission of
unproven science. In addition, providing triers of fact with expert social
science evidence does not guarantee that their assessments of credibility
will be free of the hue and cry assumption in cases involving delayed
disclosure. The suggestion made in the preceding paragraphs is a
preliminary one. Further consideration would be required before
determining whether it is a strong and advisable response to ill-founded
social assumptions in legal contexts where some assumption will
inevitably be relied upon to drive an inference as to credibility. Perhaps
there are other ways to respond to this specific problem, such as a more
comprehensible statement of the law clarifying the implications of the
reasoning in D.D. Nonetheless, some response is necessary.

Conclusion
The issue of delayed disclosure and its relevance to a complainant‟s
credibility continues to be an area of confusion in evidence law. In part,
this can be attributed to the vague and unusual language of section 275 of
the Criminal Code. In part it can be attributed (at least in the last ten years)
to the interpretive ambiguities resulting from Justice Major‟s reasoning in
D.D. But at least in part, it is likely that the inconsistencies stem from the
persistence of the social assumption that the natural time for sexual assault
victims to raise a hue and cry is at first opportunity. In R. v. L.F., the
Ontario Superior Court commented that:
A trier of fact should place little or no reliance on stereotypical reasoning, such as the
historical attitude that the evidence of women and children should be viewed with suspicion,
particularly in sexual assault cases.
Racial stereotyping, that is, the assumption that certain racial or ethnic groups are less
worthy of belief, must of course play no part in the credibility assessment.96

of the deceased was the final desperate act of a woman who sincerely believed that she
would be killed that night”.
96. R v LF, 71 WCB (2d) 307 (Ont Sup Ct) [emphasis added].
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If it is obvious that racial stereotyping must of course play no part in
assessing the credibility of racial minorities, is it not equally obvious that
sexist stereotypes should play no part in assessing the credibility of
women? It seems difficult for some courts to fully reject the engrained
assumptions underpinning social understandings of sexual violence. Given
this, it is incumbent upon legal commentators, law reformers and judges to
do more to recognize and respond to circumstances in which inferential
reasoning continues to be informed by ill-founded assumptions stemming
from a history of problematic and discriminatory attitudes towards sexual
violence.
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